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TOOLS

Achieving Foundation Accountability and
Transparency: Lessons From the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation’s Scorecard
David C. Colby, Ph.D.; Nancy W. Fishman, M.P.H.; and Sarah G. Pickell, B.A.;
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

Key Points
· The purpose of this article is to help foundations
in their accountability and transparency efforts by
sharing lessons from one foundation’s journey to
develop a scorecard.
· A commitment to funding and sharing the results
from rigorous evaluations set the tone for Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) accountability.
· The Scorecard is a powerful tool for RWJF to
set goals, track organizational effectiveness, and
motivate responses to shortcomings.

the Pew Memorial Trust did not issue an annual
or other similar report from 1948 through 1970.
By contrast, in 1952 Russell Leffingwell, chairman of the Carnegie Corp., said, “We think the
foundation should have glass pockets” (Foundation Center, 2010). Yet even today, according to
the Foundation Center (2009), only 13 percent of
foundations publish annual reports.

Despite fairly limited requirements of private
foundations to provide information, there are
important benefits to be gained from provid· Foundations can tailor their scorecard to include
what best serves their needs.
ing more information. Writing about the abuse
of concentrated private economic power, Louis
· With its Scorecard, RWJF found that comparative
Brandeis (1914) wrote that “sunlight is said to
and quantitative measures are the most powerful
forces to motivate change.
be the best of disinfectants.” Today the Brandeis
quotation is mainly applied to governmental
· Setting targets motivates staff to focus their efforts
power, but it could be applied to foundations as
on certain areas and make improvements.
well. Shining light on foundation work by having
Introduction
objective, public assessments can encourage
Private foundations are peculiar institutions. They improved performance and more effective use
are formed from the generosity of those with
of funds. Additionally, as Joel Fleischman points
private wealth, yet they have public purposes.
out, transparency is the antidote for invisibility
Unlike public corporations, they don’t answer to
and political vulnerability of the foundation secstockholders; unlike governmental bodies, they
tor (2007, pp. 149-165). Easy to say but harder
don’t answer to the electorate; and unlike unions, to do; without the bottom line of the for-profit
universities, and many charities, they don’t have
world, foundations often struggle to find the right
members, students, or other constituents.
measures of success– ones that can be easily
understood and that provide genuine measures of
When J. Howard Pew was asked about publishing impact. The challenge to the philanthropic world
an annual report on the Pew Memorial Trust, he
is to create tools that provide accountability and
said, “I’m not telling anybody anything. It’s my
transparency.
money, isn’t it?” (Nielsen, 1972, p. 126). Indeed,
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This article explores the work of the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation (RWJF) to first measure
impact and then share what has been learned.
While there are a number of tools for measuring
impact, this article briefly presents background
information about RWJF’s experience with program evaluation, and then focuses on tracking
organizational effectiveness using its Scorecard.
The purpose is to help other foundations in their
accountability and transparency efforts by sharing
lessons from one foundation’s journey.

RWJF’s Commitment to Accountability and
Transparency Through Evaluations
All foundations are born with silver spoons in
their mouths; additionally, the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation was born lucky. Both early
trustees and staff members supported the need to
understand the impact of the foundation’s work.
The early board of trustees was dominated by
former executives of Johnson & Johnson who valued measurement and were comfortable asking
whether a program had impact, just as they did
for a new drug going to market. This commitment
to answering the question, “How are we doing?”
and sharing the results publicly set the tone for
the development of the foundation’s approach and
pervades its culture today.
The first and most traditional method of measuring impact embraced by the foundation’s board
and staff was the program evaluation. These
evaluations became the dominant mode in answering the question, “How are we doing?” and
provided experience for staff in sharing results,
both good and bad. From the beginning RWJF
chose to make its evaluations public. This was
the strategy: Develop an intervention, evaluate
it, and make that evaluation public so that others
would be convinced of the intervention’s worth
and adopt it.
Early in the foundation’s development, the staff
recommended a policy that evaluations should
be conducted on projects over $1 million with
multiple sites when there might be measurable
outcomes within a reasonable span of time. The
foundation’s 1973 annual report noted:
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While the evaluation of programs designed to alter
the way institutions and people act cannot yet be
classified as a science, the staff and trustees have
agreed that we must develop thoughtful, professional
ways of weighing the effectiveness of our various programs. Clearly, our society will require solid objective
data which demonstrate the worth of a particular
program if it is to be widely accepted, transported to
other regions, or publicly financed. (Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation, 1973, p. 25)

Despite fairly limited requirements
of private foundations to provide
information, there are important
benefits to be gained from providing
more information. Shining light on
foundation work by having objective,
public assessments can encourage
improved performance and more
effective use of funds.
In the second year of the foundation, the Rand
Corp. evaluated a 44-site, $35 million foundation
program to develop the emergency medical system. That evaluation was largely unsuccessful because of data collection problems. David Rogers,
president of the foundation at that time, wrote:
“When planning the Rand Corporation study, the
Foundation was early in its development, and our
lack of experience in service programs and evaluations alike led us to make several fundamental
errors” (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1978,
p. 15). Even though the evaluation was flawed, it
shows an early commitment both to evaluation
and to sharing results. Rand finished the evaluation in 1978, publishing the results in a 1984
monograph.
Since the emergency medical system evaluation,
RWJF has funded more than 400 evaluations.
While evaluation questions and methods have

71

Colby, Fishman, and Pickell

varied, foundation staff agree that “tough-minded
and pragmatic documentation of the worth of
their efforts carried out by … third party evaluation groups” (Aiken, Blendon, Rogers, & Freeman,
1980, p. 128) is essential.
Where possible, evaluation results are published in peer-reviewed journals; if not accepted
for publication they are shared with program
participants and available upon request. Currently, evaluation reports are also posted on the
foundation’s website, including interim reports,
final reports, and peer-reviewed journal articles.
A section of the website is devoted exclusively to
this work. Evaluations are made public to share
the foundation’s findings with others interested in
similar work. RWJF believes that making a difference in the health and health care of all Americans is more readily accomplished by openly
sharing successes and failures of programs.

Although program evaluation
was a part of foundation work
from its inception, it took longer
for foundation staff to develop an
appropriate vehicle to assess the
organization as a whole – to assess
itself at the enterprise level.
Organizational Assessment: The RWJF
Scorecard
Although program evaluation was a part of foundation work from its inception, it took longer for
foundation staff to develop an appropriate vehicle
to assess the organization as a whole – to assess
itself at the enterprise level. In 1993, staff presented to the board the first Scorecard assessing the
foundation as an organization. Since the beginning, the Scorecard served as an important tool
to gauge improvement and track organizational
progress. RWJF’s Scorecard, however, has evolved
significantly. More recently it has been used as
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a vehicle to share our results through a public
version posted on our website. This evolution incorporated new tools for assessment and reflected
a change in emphasis from being strategic at the
program level to being strategic at the organizational level. Incremental changes occurred to
reflect changes in the foundation’s interests or
concerns. Each year foundation staff revisits the
type of data included in the Scorecard, balancing
the need for consistent measures over time with
the foundation’s changing needs for accountability. RWJF continues on its journey to assess
organizational performance. Below we discuss the
Scorecard’s progression over time.
Early "Scorecard"
In 1993 the foundation developed its first Scorecard. This report, included as a separate section
in the quarterly board book, stated:
The foundation’s ability to achieve our mission of
improving health and health care for all Americans
depends, in large part, on the types of interventions
supported, the strategic coherence of those interventions, their timing, and the effectiveness with which
they are implemented. Over the past several years
we have stated our intent to improve the strategic
coherence of our interventions by using multi-site
demonstrations only when they are the best means to
achieve our end, by increasing our convening function, by applying various types of interventions to a
common problem to attempt a synergistic effect, and
by reconsidering the appropriate targets of interventions. (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1993, p. 1)

Most of the first Scorecard focused on broad
foundation goals (such as improving access to
care), and answered the question about how the
foundation was doing with case studies of specific
programs. Since RWJF did not have specific, measurable strategies to achieve its goals, it had to
rely on assessments of individual programs as the
basis of the Scorecard. Thus, the enterprise-level
assessment was the sum of the parts.
A survey of grantees and applicants provided the
only quantitative assessment of the foundation as
well as the only assessment at the organizational
level. Survey questions focused on accessibility
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TABLE 1 Sources of RWJF Scorecard Data

Sources of RWJF Scorecard Data
Survey

Year of Introduction

Frequency

Grantee Survey

1993; CEP in 2004

Every other year, odd years

Health Care Industry Leaders Survey

2006

Every other year, even years

Health Policy Experts Survey

2007

Every other year, odd years

Public Opinion Survey

1993

Every year

Staff Survey

1993

Every other year, odd years

Balanced "Scorecard"
In 1999 Lewis Sandy, then the executive vice president of RWJF, wrote to the board that in business there had been increasing discontent with
Moving Toward a More Robust Assessment
the limitations of traditional financial measures
In July 1994, Steven Schroeder, then president of
available to assess a company’s health. In response
RWJF, noted in his message to the board – the
to these limitations, businesses were adopting the
first to focus on the Scorecard – that while the
balanced scorecard, which blended financial and
Scorecard was more qualitative than quantitative, nonfinancial measures to provide a picture of a
he hoped this would change moving forward. And company’s total health. In a similar fashion, Sandy
over time, a more balanced approach evolved.
and others at the foundation thought it critical
to report on the balance between making good
In 1996 the foundation developed a Scorecard
grants and delivering results in the Scorecard
debuting quantitative data on all aspects of
(Sandy, 1999).
programming. This new style of the Scorecard
provided information on the three interventions
The foundation gradually developed elements of
– demonstrations, research, and training – aca balanced Scorecard to gauge the foundation’s
counting for 95 percent of the foundation’s grant- overall performance starting in 1999, but did not
making. Specifically examining these areas of
present a full articulation of it until 2001. The
significant investment helped the foundation plan 2001 balanced Scorecard reported measures of
future programming during a time of significant
the foundation’s performance on four distinct
asset expansion. In the next year the foundation
areas of its work – program development, impact,
built upon the quantitative-focused Scorecard
staff development, and customer service. Overby including three-year trend data on RWJF’s
time, RWJF staff identified and incorporated key
grantmaking, and results from surveys and scans
components of the Scorecard that increased its
of grantees, policymakers, external stakeholders
usefulness to staff and trustees.
(including opinion elites and providers), and the
public.
Key Features That Strengthened the
and usefulness of foundation information and
programs, staff expertise, and grant application
process. The survey was repeated in 1997.

Scorecard

Over the next several years the quantitative
elements of the Scorecard were revised and
expanded. Revisions to questions and additional
questions that are of immediate concern are
considered each year while retaining standard
questions that provide consistent information
over time. Major additions are shown in Table 1.
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Articulating Strategic Goals
As RWJF shifted from developing and implementing strategic programs to strategies of social
change, the Scorecard evolved to reflect this
change. The 1999 Scorecard announced the foundation was developing long-term strategic goals
along with performance indicators to measure its
performance in meeting those goals. For example,
one of the strategic goals of the foundation’s work
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TABLE 2 Progress on Current Indicators and Objectives (August 2008–July 2009)

Indicators
Due

Indicators
Completed
By Target
Date

Indicators
Completed
Late

Indicators In
Progress

Indicators
Not
Completed

Indicators
Dropped

Childhood
Obesity

0

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Public Health

4

4 (100%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Coverage

5

4 (80%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

1 (20%)

0 (0%)

Quality/
Equality

3

2 (67%)

0 (0%)

1 (33%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Building
Human Capital

4

1 (25%)

1 (25%)

1 (25%)

0 (0%)

1 (25%)

Pioneer

0

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Vulnerable
Populations

0

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Total

16

11 (69%)

1 (6%)

2 (13%)

1 (6%)

1 (6%)

Health

Health Care

in end-of-life care was to improve the quality of
such care. An indicator of success in reaching that
goal was to establish palliative care services in 20
percent of U.S. hospitals within a decade.
In 2000 the Scorecard presented strategic goals
for all areas of the foundation’s work, but featured
only a selection of indicators focused on the
foundation’s tobacco and coverage work. These
performance indicators linked program work with
outcome measures that indicated broader success.
For example, the goal of the foundation’s work in
tobacco was to decrease the number of Americans using tobacco. To bring about that goal, the
foundation expected an increase in tobacco taxes
to result in an increase in young smokers seeking
treatment, and that would result in a decrease in
smoking. The amount of tobacco taxes and the
number of people seeking treatment, as well as
the strategic goal of decreasing the number of
Americans using tobacco, were measurable.
This was an important new step for staff, reflecting the foundation’s ongoing effort to articulate
and measure not just program-level goals but
strategic goals in programmatic areas. These
measures informed the board on the foundation’s
progress, as well as helped staff focus clusters of
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programs addressing a strategic goal. Progress on
strategic goals and related indicators continues
to be reported in the Scorecard. Table 2 reports
progress on current indicators for each team during a one-year time period.
Using Comparative Data
Another key element of the Scorecard was the
use of comparison data. In the 1990s RWJF relied
on its own grantee survey, conducted by outside
research organizations. This survey asked similar
questions year to year, polling respondents on
their perception of the foundation in addition
to their perception of a small comparison group
made up of similarly sized foundations. Nevertheless, very few of the comparative survey results
were presented in the Scorecard.
In 2004 the foundation first used the Grantee
Perception Report by the Center for Effective
Philanthropy (CEP) instead of its own grantee
survey. In addition to presenting results from the
foundation’s grantees, the CEP data provide comparative data on many other foundations. These
comparative data were reported first in the 2004
Scorecard. Although the foundation had scored
well in its own previous surveys of grantees, using
the CEP survey to compare grantee ratings of
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RWJF with grantee ratings of other foundations
was a jolting wake-up call.
The comparative results of the CEP grantee
survey identified several areas for improvement
at the foundation. Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, foundation president and chief executive officer, sent an
email to the field titled, “‘How’re We Doing?’ (We
Can, and Will, Do Better).” The email highlighted
relatively poor scores in grantee satisfaction, fair
treatment of grantees, responsiveness of the staff,
clarity of funding priorities, and grantee selection as well as the foundation’s commitment to
making improvements. The comparative data and
the subsequent process improvement work the
foundation conducted exemplify how a scorecard
can be used for organizational improvement.
The experience with the CEP data showed comparisons as a valuable feature of the Scorecard.
Using comparative information in other surveys,
particularly those of external stakeholders, has
become a consistent approach. While earlier
Scorecards occasionally included comparative
data for this group, specific comparison information was only consistently reported in the Scorecard beginning in 2006. Finding the right comparisons among ever-changing organizations can
be challenging; comparison groups are examined
frequently to assess their usefulness. Most often,
a comparison group for a survey of external stakeholders is made up of other large foundations. At
times RWJF has expanded the comparison organizations beyond foundations to include national
health care organizations, such as the Institute of
Medicine, and think tanks, such as the American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution.
RWJF looks to compare itself with organizations
that are national in scope, concerned with health
and health care issues, provide information or
grants, and strive to influence social change.
Setting "Scorecard" Targets
Setting targets for selected measures became
an important aspect of the Scorecard in 2001.
Originally, perfection as represented by the
highest possible score was by default set as the
target. Since achieving perfection may be difficult
and costly, senior management decided to adopt
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targets that were short of perfection. For several
years, research and evaluation staff members, in
consultation with the president, chose the targets.
In 2009 senior management initiated a review of
targets.
In setting new targets in 2009, senior management selected 24 measures that would be highlighted with targets. Senior management used
different target setting methods for each type of
data (grantee, external stakeholder, and staff surveys). For example, the targets for grantee-survey
results were set using a statistical method; this
works particularly well for these data because of
the large number of foundations participating in
the CEP survey.
Although for many years RWJF did not set
targets, setting targets is an important feature of
the Scorecard. It forces staff members to identify
areas of improvement, to set goals to achieve, and
to identify ways to make changes to achieve those
goals. In 2007, after some staff survey scores
dropped significantly, senior management identified new targets for that part of the Scorecard and,
over a two-year period, developed improvements
to address problem areas.
The percentages of the target achieved are displayed in a spider diagram, allowing the reader
to see quickly how the foundation is doing.
(See Figure 1.) Each side of the spider diagram
represents an element of the balanced Scorecard.
For example, the foundation’s efforts on program
impact are on the lower left of the diagram. The
closer a dot is to the outside edge of the diamond,
the closer the percentage is to 100 and the closer
the foundation is to meeting its target. In Program Impact, the foundation did not reach any of
its targets, but came relatively close on some (e.g.,
percent of current objectives completed).
Sharing Results
The Scorecard was originally intended as a
document for internal use to be presented to
the board and staff. Findings from the Scorecard
were included in the president’s message and, as
mentioned earlier, foundation President and CEO
Risa Lavizzo-Mourey in 2004 included results of
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FIGURE 1 2009 Balanced Scorecard Summary.
		
Reviewing Key Indicators of Our Performance

Source: 2009 RWJF Scorecard

the CEP survey in an email to grantees discussing process improvement efforts inspired by that
grantee survey. In 2005 there was a discussion
about sharing the report with the public. This was
implemented in 2007, when the foundation made
available a modified version of the Scorecard
called the Assessment Report on www.rwjf.org. In
76

this modified report the financial and staff data
have been removed, and data about comparison
organizations are aggregated.
Although the Scorecard evolved significantly
over its 17-year history, its role as a continuous
quality-improvement tool endures. Strategic indiTHE
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cators, comparison groups, targets, and making
the report public are features of the Scorecard,
improving its usefulness. At times the scores
reported and the perceptions shared through the
Scorecard indicated the foundation has fallen
short of its goals. Sometimes further exploration
of the problem was needed before improvements
could be implemented, but most of the time
problems identified in the Scorecard become
top priorities for the foundation. Responses to
problems identified in the Scorecard have often
resulted in significant improvement in the foundation’s philanthropic practice.

Current Scorecard
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Scorecard takes its cues from the original balanced
scorecard for business created by Robert S.
Kaplan and David P. Norton. Today, the Scorecard looks at four distinct areas to assess overall
foundation performance: Program Development, Program Impact, Grantee Relations, and
Financial and Human Capital. These four areas
are of equal weight, informing one another and
contributing to the overall assessment of the
foundation’s performance.
The Program Development section examines
the foundation’s ability to create programs that
support its guiding principles and help fulfill its
mission. Input from the public, health care industry leaders, health policy experts, and grantees
help the foundation evaluate the strength of its
strategies and the degree to which its programs
are timely and relevant.
Next, the Program Impact section assesses the
foundation’s ability to achieve its goals. Through
the tracking of indicators, this section reports
progress on internally managed benchmarks that
are established by the strategic teams through
which the foundation does its grantmaking.
Additionally, this section includes input from
grantees and external stakeholders, providing
an outside perception of both the foundation’s
impact and the degree to which it is achieving its
mission of improving the health and health care
of all Americans. Finally, this section reports on
the impact of the foundation’s effort to communicate to its audiences, featuring general data
2011 Vol 3:1&2

on the performance of its website and statistics
about how visitors use the site.

At times the scores reported and
the perceptions shared through
the Scorecard indicated the
foundation has fallen short of
its goals. Sometimes further
exploration of the problem was
needed before improvements could
be implemented, but most of the
time problems identified in the
Scorecard become top priorities
for the foundation. Responses to
problems identified in the Scorecard
have often resulted in significant
improvement in the foundation’s
philanthropic practice.
The following section, Grantee Relations,
explores the effectiveness of the foundation’s
service to grantees, illuminating its strengths
and weaknesses in helping them carry out their
work. As noted above, the CEP Grantee Perception Report has enabled the foundation to better
understand how its service is perceived by some
of its constituents – the grantees. In the Grantee
Relations section, internal efficiency measures
are also reported, including the median days
from receiving proposal to sending check and the
timing of communications with applicants during
the funding process.
The Financial and Human Capital section examines the health of its assets – both financial
and personnel. This section features a look at
the investment portfolio and its performance
compared to endowments of peer organizations.
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A comparison of administrative and program
spending ratios of the foundation and several
other foundations, as computed from public tax
information, is also reported. A survey of the entire staff, administered every other year, gathers
information about the work environment at the
foundation.

Using the Scorecard as an internal
quality improvement tool alone
is beneficial. But sharing the
Scorecard with the field has
additional benefits. Our experience
shows that public explanations of
a foundation’s work and objective
measures of its organizational
impact further establish its
credibility.
The last section of the Scorecard serves as an
appendix featuring the basic anatomy of grant
activity over the past years. This section provides
an opportunity to explore trends and changes
in grantmaking and to see how the foundation’s strategy affects the nature of its grants and
grantees.

Conclusions: Lessons Learned
While over 30 foundations make some, or all,
of their CEP Grantee Perception Report results
public (CEP, 2010), few develop a scorecard on
all dimensions of their work and make them
public. The Commonwealth Fund released one
scorecard in 2006 (Commonwealth Fund, 2006),
but has not repeated it; the James Irvine Foundation publically released its performance report
since 2006 (Irvine Foundation, 2006-2009). The
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation developed its
Scorecard for internal use only for 14 years before
producing its public version, Assessment Report,
for the past three years. The purpose of this article is to share the experience of one foundation,
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to provide valuable lessons for other foundations,
and, hopefully, to demystify the foundation’s effort to produce an organizational-level Scorecard.
It’s the culture. A foundation that asks, “How are
we doing?” and expects independent, objective analysis to inform the answer has taken the
crucial first step toward accountability. In some
situations, the culture is dependent upon a leader.
For example, the Ford Foundation’s hiring of
Luis Ubiñas, a former director at McKinsey, as
president seems to bode a cultural change at an
organization that did not previously emphasize
measurement and accountability. In other situations, the culture is a result of historical circumstances as it was at this foundation. Nevertheless,
even when one has the luck of the latter situation,
leaders need to reinforce the culture.
It’s a journey. When the culture supports accountability efforts, it is important to develop
something – almost anything – to respond to the
cultural needs. The first Scorecard at the foundation was a very qualitative document that did not
address directly the impact of the foundation as
an organization. In incremental fashion over 17
years, RWJF introduced quantitative elements,
adopted the balanced scorecard framework,
provided comparative data, and made the report
public. Through all the Scorecard’s iterations, the
foundation’s core values are reflected by focusing on the question, “How are we doing?” and
providing objective answers.
It can be done on the cheap. Foundations can
tailor their scorecard to include what best serves
their needs. Using internal metrics every year
and the CEP Grantee Perception Report every
other year would provide robust information,
but would be inexpensive. Although this foundation’s Scorecard has more elements and is more
expensive than the one suggested above, it is a
very small part of total administrative costs. In
its early years, Scorecard costs were mainly associated with staff time. Today the Scorecard is
still a relatively inexpensive mechanism to hold
ourselves accountable. The costs of the surveys
and production of both the Scorecard and the
Assessment Report run about $270,000 per year.
The vast majority of the cost is for surveys (95
THE
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percent) and, of the survey costs, the national
public opinion survey accounts for 84 percent.
Additional cost is in staff time, which is less than
one full-time person.
Comparative, quantitative measures are powerful. Early qualitative and quantitative measures
were informative, but they were never powerful enough to drive change at the foundation.
Receiving the results of the CEP survey of the
foundation’s grantees along with the comparisons
from other, similar foundations provided a strong
wake-up call, driving internal quality improvement, especially around the grant process and our
communications.
Setting targets provides motivating goals. Without explicit targets, there was little motivation to
make the changes necessary to improve based on
the Scorecard. Having senior managers choose
the areas that they wanted to emphasize and
pick targets for those areas fixed ownership and
provided a strong basis for quality improvement
efforts. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, nothing
focuses the mind like a measurable target.
Let the sunshine in. For some organizations,
transparency is difficult; for others it is very
natural. Since the beginning, foundation program
evaluations were made public. That was part of a
strategy to sustain and spread innovations by presenting evidence of their effectiveness. Moreover,
there was a major spillover effect from the public
nature of evaluations – often the credibility of
the foundation was strengthened because it was
willing to have evaluations published that showed
program failures.
Using the Scorecard as an internal quality improvement tool alone is beneficial. But sharing the
Scorecard with the field has additional benefits.
Our experience shows that public explanations
of a foundation’s work and objective measures
of its organizational impact further establish its
credibility.
In conclusion, the time when a leader of a major
foundation could say, “We’re not telling anybody
anything” has long past. Being an effective foundation requires asking the question, “How are we
2011 Vol 3:1&2

doing?” and answering it objectively. As institutions that play major roles in our society, foundations, we would argue, have a responsibility to be
public about the answer. A commitment to having
glass pockets is good for society, the philanthropic field, and the individual foundation. It’s time for
more glass pockets.
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